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Abstract—In this paper a distributed, low-complexity, fast
and fair resource allocation algorithm for a multiuser, wireless
LTE OFDMA channel is proposed. Based on the game theoretic
concept of the Nash Bargaining Solution and by grouping
users into coalitions of size 2, a cooperative solution to the
problem of subcarrier allocation is achieved. The fairness that
our algorithm provides matches that offered by the widely
accepted Proportional Fair (PF) scheduler. Our simulation results
show that the proposed algorithm achieves a sum rate that is
almost equivalent (i.e. 90%) to the sum rate achieved by the PF
scheduler, while only requiring minimal exchange of information
between nodes. At the same time, efficiency enhancements and
its distributed nature render it fast and low-complexity enough
to be implemented in a real-time wireless system.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fairly well known principle in wireless communication
systems is that it is possible to achieve a significant received
energy gain in a multiuser system if channel resources are
divided between different users in a dynamic and intelligent
fashion. This opportunity is referred to as multiuser diversity
(MUD) and an example is illustrated in [1] for the case of
how it may be achieved in a frequency selective wireless com-
munications channel. [1] also shows how multiuser diversity
can be exploited to enhance system performance. Results of a
numerical, information theoretic analysis of multiuser diversity
showing capacity gains as a function of the number of users
are given in [2]. In this paper we propose a resource allocation
algorithm for a multiuser wireless channel, where the existence
of independent communication links between the users and
their instantaneous fluctuation both in the time and frequency
domains, allows for the benefits of MUD to be harvested.
The majority of work in the existing literature makes the as-
sumption that a master device takes responsibility for dictating
the resource allocation process. This simplifies protocol issues,
but the various costs associated with this approach cannot be
ignored; the central controller needs information about the
channel quality of all wireless devices it is responsible for
allocating resources to. Furthermore, the allocation decisions
have to be sent back to wireless devices, thus altogether
generating an overhead that impedes system performance.
Additionally, this centralized approach does not lend itself very
well to the emerging ad-hoc/mesh/distributed access systems.
The aforementioned costs suggest that there are potential
benefits to be achieved if the resource allocation process takes
place in a more distributed fashion. Coalition formation is
a game theoretic concept that can be used to achieve this.
Using this approach, entities (in this case, network devices)
can cooperate with other entities on a task that is either too
difficult for a single entity or, as is the case in the resource
allocation process, on a task that could be performed more
efficiently by several entities [3]. Coalition formation can
either be centrally- or self-organized. Expensive algorithms
exist for optimal solutions for the former; the latter is robust,
scales well, and uses simple heuristics to form beneficial
coalitions at low complexity.
In this paper we present a simple, low-complexity dis-
tributed algorithm for subcarrier allocation in an LTE wireless
channel. Our approach utilizes the Nash Bargaining Solution
and the concept of coalition formation to propose a fast and
efficient algorithm to form self-organized coalitions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II
presents related work, section III outlines our system model,
section IV briefly describes the Nash Bargaining Solution
and section V presents our algorithm. Finally, results from
simulations are presented in section VI and conclusions are
drawn in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A thorough presentation of game theory application in
wireless channel resource allocation can be found in [4]. [5]
argues that cooperative game theory is not well suited to the
distributed nature of wireless networking; something that the
work presented in this paper contradicts. Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) and coalitions are used in [6] to achieve
fair resource allocation for multiuser, OFDMA-based wireless
networks. A partially distributed scheme for the allocation
of subcarriers is proposed, where the network’s base station
simply acts like a market place where the bargaining of
subcarriers among the users takes place. A scheme similar
to the above but with reduced complexity, is proposed in [7].
Finally, a distributed approach for fair resource allocation in
wireless networks using NBS is presented in [8], as well as
in [9].
The novelty of our work lies in the fact that it considers
low complexity as a key element. Most of the relevant liter-
ature in this research area discusses the resource allocation
problem mainly in terms of optimal power, rate and fairness
performance and largely neglects complexity issues. Our work
proposes an efficient and low-complexity algorithm that is
suitable for implementation in a real-time system.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESCRIPTION
We focus on the downlink scenario of the SCM LTE channel
[10]. The simulated network consists of a single Base Station
(BS) with users (Mobile Stations) randomly scattered around
it. Table I presents the channel and system parameters in more
detail. The channel quality each individual user experiences is
strongly dependent on its distance from the BS and therefore
users’ SNR values vary accordingly. In our simulations we
utilize all 1024 channel subcarriers and no subcarrier sharing
between users is allowed; at any time a single subcarrier is
only occupied by a single user. Finally, we assume that there
exists a reliable and fast feedback channel, so that users can
communicate with each other and exchange the information
required for the subcarrier allocation process. This feedback
channel is also used for the choice of an appropriate coalition
structure to be fed back from the mobile devices to the BS.
Our performance metric is the rate achievable by each user for
the whole duration of the channel simulation. We calculate the
theoretical rate of user k in subcarrier s, using the following
equation:
Rk,s =
W
S
× log2
(
1 + SNR× ‖Hk,s‖2
)
,bits/s, (1)
where W is the channel’s bandwidth, S is the number of
subcarriers in the channel and Hk,s is the channel gain for
user k in subcarrier s. Finally, the sum rate achieved by user
k for the whole channel simulation is calculated by adding up
the rates for all the subcarriers the user was allocated:
Rk =
y∑
i=1
∑
Sn
Rk,s , (2)
where Sn is the vector of subcarriers allocated to user k and
y is the number of simulated channel realizations (i.e. 2000).
IV. NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
In this section, we briefly present the basics of the Nash
Bargaining Solution [11]. As stated in detail in [6], the game
in this case is the subcarrier allocation problem, the players
are the users participating in the wireless network and the
goal is to maximize the chosen utility function for all users
simultaneously. Similarly to the aforementioned reference and
to the vast majority of the relevant literature, we choose the
TABLE I
SYSTEM & CHANNEL PARAMETERS
Channel & System Parameters
Carrier Frequency 2 GHz
Transmission Bandwidth 10 MHz
Time Slot / Sub-frame duration 0.5 ms
Number of subcarriers 1024
Base Station transmit power 43 dBm (20W)
Propagation Model SCM Urban Macro
Noise Power -104 dBm
User Equipment Noise Figure 6 dB
Cell radius 150 m
MS velocity 10 m/s
data rate (eq. 3) achieved by the user in a single channel
realization to serve as the utility function:
U =
∑
Sn
Rk,s (3)
Therefore, in order to determine the NBS, we need to find
the subcarrier allocation matrix that maximizes the product of
data rates (i.e. the Nash function) for the users-members of
each coalition:
n∏
i=1
(Ri −Rimin), (4)
where n is the number of users in each coalition, Ri is the sum
rate achieved by user i over the allocated subcarrier groups
(i.e. subchannels) and Rimin is the minimal rate requirement
of user i. As described in [6], the unique Nash Bargaining
Solution (i.e. the subcarrier allocation matrix in our system)
that maximizes the above equation satisfies the following
axioms:
1) Individual Rationality
2) Feasibility
3) Pareto Optimality
4) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
5) Independence of Linear Transformations
6) Symmetry
These axioms ensure that the NBS maximizes all Ri simulta-
neously and, at the same time, provides a fair operation point
for all participating players.
V. COALITION FORMATION AND SUBCARRIER
ALLOCATION
A. Coalition Formation
Aiming to avoid the computational complexity of finding
the optimal coalition size and structure, we pursue a simple
approach and, similar to [6], we use a standard size of 2 for
all formed coalitions. Therefore, all coalitions comprise of two
members, apart from the case where the number of users is
odd. In this case, we select to leave the single remaining user
on its own and allocate the subcarriers that were not allocated
to any coalition member to this user. The fact that all users get
the same number of subcarriers (see section V-B ‘Bargaining
for Subcarriers’), guarantees that our algorithm remains fair
to all users and is still able to deliver the cooperative game
theory benefits.
Our approach to coalition formation is straightforward; all
possible combinations of 2-sized groups among the users
participating in the channel are formed and then, after the
bargaining within each coalition has completed, the appro-
priate coalition structure (i.e. combination of coalitions) is
selected and subcarriers are allocated according to the bargain-
ing outcome (i.e the subcarrier allocation matrix that yields
the highest product of data rates for the members of each
coalition). In order to keep the simulation time requirements at
a reasonable level we chose to use a relatively small number of
users (i.e. 5) in our model. Moreover, this number was chosen
to illustrate the algorithm’s fair behavior when the number of
users is odd and, therefore, not all users (in this case only one
user) are part of a coalition.
B. Bargaining for Subcarriers
Following the formation of all possible coalition struc-
tures, the outcome that each structure can yield needs to
be determined. Towards this aim, bargaining within each
coalition’s members using the NBS takes place. An array
of all possible subcarrier permutations for the two users
comprising each coalition is generated; we examine all the
different subcarrier-user permutations to determine which one
generates the highest product of user rates (i.e. among the
members of each coalition). These computations take place
within each coalition, hence the distributed nature of the
algorithm. A limited signalling between coalition members
is required in order to exchange the necessary information
(i.e. achievable rates for each subcarrier) used during the
calculations. However, the exhaustive search for the optimal
subcarrier-user permutation is simply infeasible, due to the
huge complexity of this operation. Therefore, we choose to
make some major modifications to this approach, so as to
achieve a significantly improved efficiency for our algorithm.
1) Subcarrier Grouping: Allocating subcarriers one by
one is a very complex process, requiring the testing of nk
subcarrier permutations, where n is the number of users in
each coalition and k is the number of channel subcarriers.
Additionally, most practical systems allocate resources in
physical blocks that are usually larger than a single unit.
Therefore, our approach is to group consecutive subcarriers
into groups and allocate them as a single unit. This results in
a slight loss of sum rate performance, as a degree of fine-
grained control of the allocation process is lost. However,
our experiments show that using 10-sized subcarrier groups is
an excellent compromise between sum rate performance and
algorithm efficiency, as now 2102 instead of 21024 permutations
need to be tested. Generally, forming subcarrier groups of size
s provides a nk×
(s−1)
s
- fold increase in speed. An additional
benefit is that memory requirements for the algorithm execu-
tion are significantly reduced, thus allowing it to run on less
powerful devices, where memory might be limited.
TABLE II
THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
The subcarrier allocation process
1. Initiation
- Create array of all possible coalition structures
- Create array of all possible subcarrier group permutations for
each coalition
- Create array that holds achievable rates for all users
2. For each coalition structure
- For each subcarrier group permutation
- For each coalition of the coalition structure
- perform Nash Bargaining among the coalition members
- after bargaining, update array that holds users’ rates
3. Choose appropriate coalition structure
- calculate Jain’s fairness index for each coalition structure
- for PF fairness, choose coalition structure with lowest Jain’s
index
4. Go to 1. and repeat allocation process as necessary
2) Equal number of subcarriers: Extensive experimentation
with the PF scheduler revealed that all users in the wireless
channel get roughly the same number of subcarriers per
channel simulation. Similarly, testing the proposed algorithm
showed that the best strategy is to allocate an equal number of
subcarriers to each user in order to maintain a level of fairness
similar to proportional fairness. The difference in individual
user rate performance stems from the fact that subcarriers dif-
fer in ‘quality’ for each user. Thus, by allocating equal number
of subcarrier groups to each user we make our algorithm much
faster, as the number of subcarrier permutations that need to
be tested is significantly reduced. By making this choice the
number of permutations is further reduced by a factor of 5,
for the case of a network with 5 users, 1024 subcarriers and
10-sized subcarrier groups.
3) No minimum rate requirement: The NBS solution re-
quires that eq. 4 for the members of each coalition is maxi-
mized. However, depending on the minimal rate requirement
of each user, the aforementioned equation might not converge
to a solution and thus render the allocation process incom-
plete. To avoid this complication, and based on the fact that
the allocation of equal number of subcarriers to each user
guarantees a minimum level of service, we set Rimin equal
to zero. This choice also improves the execution speed of the
algorithm and provides [6] a proportionally fair behavior to
our allocation process.
C. Choice of Coalition structure
The last stage of the allocation process is to select the
‘winning’ coalition structure. Our simulations indicate that
the proposed algorithm generates almost identical fairness and
sum rates across all coalition structures and, therefore, the
choice of a specific coalition structure only marginally changes
the outcome of the allocation process. This result offers
the opportunity to further reduce the allocation algorithm’s
Fig. 1. Sum rate comparison
complexity, by sacrificing only a minimal percentage of the
sum rate, and will be explored in future work.
D. Efficiency Enhancements
1) Permutations sampling: Despite eliminating the subcar-
rier group permutations that do not provide an equal number
of subcarrier groups to all users, there is still a very large
number of permutations to be tested. Based on the observation
that no significant differences from permutation to permutation
exist, we only test a sample of them. Sampling at a ‘rate’ of
1/m (i.e. test 1 out of m permutations) increases the algorithm
execution speed by a factor of m. According to our simulations,
for values of m up to 103 the loss of sum rate performance
does not exceed 7% and for m up to 104 loss does not exceed
15%.
2) Realizations step: By repeating the allocation process
less often than every channel realization we are able to yield
a great increase in algorithm efficiency, maintain fairness and
only reduce the sum rate by an insignificant amount, as proved
during our simulations. Repetition of the allocation process
every l realizations provides an l-fold increase in algorithm
speed. For example, setting l equal to 10 produces a 10-fold
increase in speed, while only a 4% loss in sum rate is incurred
for the mobility scenario simulated. Further enhancement is
possible, but repeating the process even less often can delay
users’ access to channel resources and thus degrade user
performance in time-sensitive applications.
VI. RESULTS
The results of the proposed algorithm are compared against
results generated by the widely accepted Proportional Fair
scheduler [12]. The time window we used for the PF scheduler
is 500-subcarriers long. According to our experiments, this is a
value that provides a good balance between sum rate and short-
term fairness among users. Simulation was performed for 2000
different channels (i.e. different users’ locations), with each
channel being simulated for 2000 realizations (i.e. uncorrelated
Fig. 2. Jain’s index comparison
instances of small scale fading effects). The results presented
in this section are averaged over the 2000 different channels.
A. Sum rate
We use the sum rate achieved by the users in the channel
as a basic performance metric. The proposed algorithm yields
a sum rate that is equivalent to 90% of the PF sum rate on
average, with this number varying from about 75% to 105%.
The reason for this variance is the fact that users’ long-term
channel qualities vary significantly (i.e. due to the random
location of the users around the Base Station) between the
different channels that are simulated. This is an excellent
result, given the speed improvement over the PF scheduler
that our algorithm achieves, and is illustrated in Fig. 1, where
a histogram of the sum rate as a percentage of the PF sum
rate is presented.
B. Fairness
Our observations during testing indicated that the fairness
achieved is almost identical to proportional fairness. To verify
this, we calculate Jain’s fairness index (eq. 5) of both sched-
ulers and compare them:
Fairness =
(
∑n
i=1Ri)
2
(n×∑ni=1Ri2)
(5)
Ri represents the data rate achieved by user i over the whole
simulation (i.e. 2000 realizations or 2 seconds) of the channel
and n is the number of users in the channel. The value for
Fairness ranges between 0 and 1, with a result equal to
1 indicating that all users achieve the same sum data rate.
Our results show that Jain’s index achieved by the proposed
algorithm (when the coalition structure with the lowest Jain’s
index value is selected) is consistently between 90% and 105%
of Jain’s index of the PF scheduler, with the average value
being 99.5%. The histogram presented in Fig. 2 illustrates this
result.
Fig. 3. Rate and Time comparison
C. Algorithm Efficiency
The efficiency of the proposed algorithm is a very important
aspect of its performance. There exist optimal game theoretic
solutions to the subcarrier allocation problem, that are however
impractical for use in a real-time system. Our algorithm
achieves a very good balance between sum rate, fairness and
speed. As shown in Fig. 3, where sum rate and execution time
for different values of the realization step of our algorithm (i.e.
how often the allocation process is repeated) are illustrated,
the algorithm manages to retain a great amount of the PF
scheduler’s sum rate and also execute at a significantly greater
speed. These results benefit from the distributed nature of
our algorithm, as calculations are off-loaded from the central
controller to the mobile devices and thus each device has an
easier task to perform. Even though a central controller might
have greater computational capabilities than a mobile device,
the constantly and rapidly advancing computational power
of mobile devices (e.g. smartphones, laptops) guarantees that
the performance of the distributed algorithm will not suffer
significantly. Moreover, it is possible to make the algorithm
even faster by reducing the frequency at which the allocation
process is repeated. However, this could degrade performance
in terms of delay, as users might have to wait longer to get
access to the channel’s resources.
VII. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
A low-complexity, fast and efficient distributed algorithm
for resource allocation was proposed in this paper. The algo-
rithm is based on the game theoretic concepts of the Nash
Bargaining Solution and coalition formation, where wireless
users form coalitions and bargain with each other for access to
the channel’s resources (i.e. subcarriers groups). Additionally,
a very significant aspect of the proposed algorithm is the
reduced time requirement when compared to the PF scheduler.
By retaining 85% of the PF scheduler’s sum rate and achieving
almost identical fairness, our algorithm is almost 10 times
faster. In order for these results to be achieved, a fairly limited
signalling between the wireless users is necessary. The amount
of signalling required is less than in a centralized allocation
scenario and can be further reduced if necessary by repeating
the allocation process less often. While sum rate will not suffer
significantly, this could mean that users might have to wait
longer for access to the channel’s resources. Therefore, an
approach like that would be suitable for less delay-sensitive
applications.
In the future we plan to further investigate the performance
of the proposed algorithm, especially in terms of the trade-
off between sum rate and delay. Additionally, the trade-off
between algorithm complexity, sum rate and execution speed
will attract a large part of our research efforts. A detailed
investigation of the overheads involved and the correspond-
ing comparison with the overhead requirements of the PF
scheduler will also follow. In addition, we intend to improve
speed even more, mainly by smartly reducing the number of
different coalition structures our algorithm has to test before
allocating the subcarriers. The algorithm’s performance with
different coalition sizes and a larger number of participating
users will also be investigated. Finally, it is our intention to
further explore the protocol issues regarding the use of the
proposed algorithm and also present its distributed nature and
specifics of its operation in more detail.
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